College students and police investigators watched or listened to 10 prison inmates confessing to crimes. Half the confessions were true accounts; half were false-concocted for the study. Consistent with much recent research, students were generally more accurate than police, and accuracy rates were higher among those presented with audiotaped than videotaped confessions. In addition, investigators were significantly more confident in their judgments and also prone to judge confessors guilty. To determine if police accuracy would increase if this guilty response bias were neutralized, participants in a second experiment were specifically informed that half the confessions were true and half were false. This manipulation eliminated the investigator response bias, but it did not increase accuracy or lower confidence. These findings are discussed for what they imply about the post-interrogation risks to innocent suspects who confess.
In recent years, numerous high-profile DNA exonerations have surfaced, leading social science researchers, legal scholars, policy makers, and the news media to revisit the evidence upon which innocent people had been prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned. As reported in Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer's (2000) Actual Innocence, and as confirmed by data that have accumulated since that time, 20-25% of DNA exoneration cases contained full or partial confessions in evidence (www.innocenceproject.org). The shocking exonerations in New York's Central Park jogger case illustrate the point. In 1989, a female jogger was raped, brutally beaten, and left for dead in Central Park. Within 72 h, five juveniles, 14-16 years old, confessed to the assault in lurid detail. Four of the confessions were videotaped. The boys immediately retracted their statements, claiming that they were coerced and false. Yet solely on the basis of these statements, they were convicted by juries and sentenced to prison. Thirteen years later, Matias Reyes-an imprisoned serial rapist and murderer-confessed that he alone had attacked the jogger. The Reyes confession, unlike those of the boys, was corroborated by DNA tests of semen found at the crime scene. Apparently, despite the spotlight cast by the national news media, this one case contained five false confessions (Kassin, 2002; Saulny, 2002; Morgenthau, 2002) .
The jogger case and others involving proven false confessions point to two problems. The first is that innocent people can be induced to confess to crimes they did not commit. Over the years, psychologists have proposed theories of motivation, decision-making, and social influence to understand the processes of interrogation, and have used an array of research methods to understand how and why certain interrogation tactics lead suspects to confess (Davis & O'Donohue, 2003; Drizin & Leo, 2004; Gudjonsson, 1992 Gudjonsson, , 2003 Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Kassin, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985; Lassiter, 2004; Leo, 1996; Leo & Ofshe, 1998; Redlich & Goodman, 2003; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993; Zimbardo, 1967) . There is, however, a second problem evident in the jogger case and others like it: that police, district attorneys, judges, and juries believed these confessions, indicating perhaps that they cannot distinguish between self-incriminating statements that are true and those that are false. One could argue that interrogation is psychologically coercive, and that innocent people sometimes confess, but that such errors will ultimately be detected by authorities and corrected. Essential to this presumed safety net is the commonsense assumption that "I'd know a false confession if I saw one."
Is there a reason to believe that investigators can accurately distinguish between true and false confessions? Consistently, research has shown that people are not proficient at judging truth and deception, often performing at no better than chance levels (DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982; Memon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003; Vrij, 2000) , that training programs produce only small and unreliable improvements in performance (Bull, 1989; Kassin & Fong, 1999; Porter, Woodworth, & Birt, 2000; Vrij, 1994; Zuckerman, Koestner, & Alton, 1984) , and that police and other detection deception "professionals" typically perform no better than laypeople when such comparisons are made (Bull, 1989; DePaulo, 1994; DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Ekman, O'Sullivan, & Frank, 1999; Garrido & Masip, 1999; Garrido, Masip, & Herrero, 2004; Koehnken, 1987; Porter et al., 2000) . In short, the law enforcement community assumes that investigators can become highly accurate judges of truth and deception (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2001) , but there is little if any evidence to support this claim (for a recent meta-analysis of presumed cues to deception, see DePaulo et al., 2003 ; for a comprehensive review of deception detection issues in a forensic context, see Granhag & Strömwall, 2004) .
To address this question in a criminal context, Kassin and Fong (1999) examined whether people can distinguish true and false denials-and whether police training in the use of verbal and nonverbal deception cues would increase the accuracy of such judgments. In Phase 1, participants committed one of four mock crimes and then denied their involvement in an interview. In Phase 2, observers were either trained in the Reid technique approach to deception detection or not trained
